| DIS and “creative intelligence” |
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| Written by EDITOR | |||
| Wednesday, 17 March 2010 12:00 | |||
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Since the formation of the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services (DIS) the term ‘intelligence’ has been the subject of almost every discourse in this country. The various commentators on the debate often use the term to define a political situation rather than a security product. More often than not, we always find it difficult to differentiate between ‘information’ and ‘intelligence’. Contrary to popular perceptions and practices, intelligence is a product of processed information, and not the other way round. This is the most important distinction that every intelligence officer must know as it is the core of the tradecraft.
In its simplest form, the term intelligence refers to in-depth foreknowledge of the potential enemy, possible threat, and or situation that may threaten the survival and longevity of the state. This foreknowledge is used to predict and forecast the future intensions, character, tactics, and behaviour of the potential adversary or target. Therefore, intelligence as opposed to a process, is a product that in itself is a tool that helps its consumers to be able to adopt proper strategies and security posture.
Just like any other good product, good intelligence is a product of good, timely, and reliable information. It is also dependent on the quality manpower and resources the institution has in order to enable it to transform information into intelligence and also be able to interpret and disseminate it to the respective consumers. Because good intelligence requires hard work and investment of time and many intelligence officers are lazy to do it right. They often take a ride on possible threat scenarios like terrorism, coup de ta, state sabotage, and other quick to buy and sell issues.
The moment we fail to define the intelligence problem; that is, what information is required, we have automatically failed what is called intelligence appreciation; that is access to information required and the methods we can employ to access such information. These mistakes are quite common in most intelligence agencies even the most sophisticated, but I find it to be a norm with DIS. This problem leads to feeding the intelligence process with “irrelevant material” and you can imagine the product that comes thereof. Lack of good intelligence, often leads to guess work of trial and error.
Failing to do the basics right often results in agents resorting to what is known as “creative intelligence.” This habit is a product of a number of factors, but mainly, unclear mondus operandi, “preferential information”, lack of professionalism, and or politically motivated agents. The situation is worsened by intelligence analysts who twist the information to suit their assessments. This hampers intelligence prediction greatly, leads to wrong targets being identified and creates a false issues of security or insecurity.
Another big problem is poor selection of sources. Selection of sources must be based on their ability to access information when so required and to perform this task with discreet ability. It should not be based on factionalism within the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) or their loyalty to the President. They must know and understand that their relationship with the institution is purely professional rather than political which seems to be the case in DIS. We must know and appreciate that not everybody can be a reliable source, no matter how highly placed he/she may be. This advice is given on the assumption that DIS is trying to revamp their image of being a “hit squad” into a credible intelligence institution far removed from the taints of political bias and addiction of to “creative intelligence”.
Michael Motshipi
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| Last Updated on Tuesday, 16 March 2010 13:18 |
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